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1 Introduction
Spatialmodels of horizontal product differentiation, such asHotelling (1929)
or Salop (1979), have become workhorse models in regional science, spa-
tial economics as well as in industrial organization. Given this popularity,
spatial models have been ap plied to a wide variety of applications, and
numerous variants of such models have been studied.1
In this context, an important question is whether free entry leads to the op-
timal level of product variety. In spatial models of product differentiation,
such as Vickrey (1964) and Salop (1979), a well-known result is the so-called
excess entry result suggesting that the equilibrium level of entry exceeds the
socially optimal level.2
Recently, a number of contributions have challenged this view. In their ar-
ticle, Matsumura and Okamura (2006b) analyze a spatial model of prod-
uct differentiation under various assumptions on transport costs and pro-
duction cost functions. They show that, although there is excessive entry
under many circumstances, an insufficient level of product variety can also
arise. Matsumura (2000) shows that insufficient entry can arise if the integer
problem is taken into account. Moreover, Gu andWenzel (2009, 2012) show
that the excess entry result may not hold in a framework where customer
demand is price-sensitive and transport costs come as a fixed cost to cus-
1For instance, studies have focused on the structure of transport costs and customer dis-
tribution (e.g, Shilony, 1981; Matsumura and Okamura, 2006b), the introduction of search
costs (Braid, 2014), deliveredpricingmodels (Hamilton et al., 1989; Colombo, 2014), ormulti-
product competition (Janssen et al., 2005). A recent overview is provided by Biscaia and
Mota (2013).
2This is different from representative customer and discrete choice models. There, it
is understood that equilibrium product variety could either be excessive, insufficient, or
optimal depending on the model configuration (see, e.g., Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977; Sattinger,
1984). For an overview, see Anderson et al. (1992).
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tomers, independent of the quantity that is purchased.3 Finally, delivered-
price competition is considered in Matsumura and Okamura (2006a) in a
setting with a linear demand function. They find that entry can be insuffi-
cient when the entry cost is large.
As van der Weijde et al. (2014) point out, one limitation in these contri-
butions is that, although the distance between customers and the prod-
uct they buy brings about disutility, the quantity a customer demands is
independent of the transport costs. In many applications, however, cus-
tomer demand depends naturally on both the selling price and the degree
of matching between the customer and the product. For example, consider
two productsA andB. For the same price, if productA is a better substitute
to a customer’s ideal product than product B, not only does this customer
choose A over B; she may also buy more of product A compared to having
to purchase the more distant product B.
To address this limitation, we revisit the question of free and optimal en-
try in a setting where customer demand is price-sensitive and where, in
contrast to previous contributions, transport costs to customers are on a
per-unit basis. This means that customers have to incur a transport cost
(disutility costs) for each unit they purchase. As such, our setup can thus
be interpreted in two ways. First, it may represent product differentiation
along a taste dimension where a transport cost per unit representing the
mismatch of product characteristic and a customer’s preference is a suit-
able assumption. Second, it may reflect a situation where a customer incurs
actual transportation costs per unit shipped (geographical interpretation),
i.e., shipping a greater number of items results in an increase in the shipping
3Note that in the original setup and in many applications, it is assumed that each cus-
tomer demands one unit of a differentiated product, independent of the price.
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costs.4
We use a model of product differentiation with price-sensitive demand and
a per-unit transport cost. For tractability we focus on a linear demand func-
tion. In this setting, we characterize the price equilibrium and the level of
entry in a free-entry equilibrium. We provide a comparison of equilibrium
entry and the socially optimal level of entry. Our main finding is that for a
high market entry cost, entry need not be excessive but can be insufficient.
More precisely, we show that entry is insufficient if the transport cost per
unit is high as in precisely those cases customers would strongly benefit
from more entry. At the same time, however, firms’ incentives to enter are
low due to low profits.
It is instructive to compare the results of this paper with models where the
transport costs come as a fixed cost (Gu and Wenzel, 2012).5 In both ap-
proaches, insufficient entry occurs for sufficiently high transport costs, but
for different reasons. With fixed transport costs, the reason for insufficient
product variety comesmainly from the customer side aswith high transport
costs, prices are high and demand is low so that customers would benefit a
lot from more entry and the associated lower prices. The incentives to en-
ter, though, are still relatively strong as firm profits increase with the level
of transport costs. The effects are different with per-unit transport costs.
Here, changes in the transport-cost parameter or changes in the number of
firms directly affect customer demand and hence welfare (whereas these
parameters affect customer demand only indirectly through the price in Gu
4This is different from another geographical viewwhich is not covered here. For instance,
regarding spatial competition among supermarkets or fast-food restaurants with an identi-
cal product range on offer, fixed transport costs covering the actual transportation (the cost
of driving to a supermarket/restaurant) is a reasonable modeling assumption.
5Note, however, that the magnitude and parameter values across the two models are not
directly comparable since the two approaches are not nested.
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and Wenzel, 2012). As a consequence, high transport costs lead to low firm
profits (due to low local demand) and low incentives to enter themarket. At
the same time, welfare strongly increases with entry as local demand rises.
Taken together, we show that these two effects can lead to insufficient entry
if the transport cost is high enough.
The novelty of the paper is to analyze equilibrium entry in a setting with
price-sensitive demand and a per-unit transport cost. As such, it may con-
tribute to the growing literature onprice-sensitive demand inmodels of hor-
izontal product differentiation6 and help to better understand how robust
the results are when the impact of the transport costs on customer utility is
changed.
2 Model
There are n ≥ 2 price-setting firms which are equidistant from each other
along the circular city of unit length, i.e., the distance between any two
neighboring firms is equal to 1/n (Salop, 1979). Their marginal costs of pro-
duction are normalized to zero.
Customers of mass one are uniformly distributed along the circle. All cus-
tomers buy from one of the firms in the market (see Assumption 1 below).
Let q denote the quantity a customer demands at a given price and location.
A customer who is located at x and who buys from firm i at location Li
(with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) derives the following utility
6Recent analyses which explore the impact of price-sensitive demand on market out-
comes while employing either a per-unit or a fixed transport cost approach are Colombo
(2011) (on the effects of spatial price discrimination), Rasch andHerre (2013) (on the stability
of collusion), and Esteves and Reggiani (2014) (on the effects of behavior-based pricing). van
der Weijde et al. (2014) analyze the scheduling decisions of competing transport providers
when customers’ demand depends on timing.
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U(x, pi) = q − q
2
2
− q (pi + τ |Li − x|) , (1)
where τ is the transport-cost parameter and pi denotes the price charged by
firm i. The utility specification implies that a customer incurs the transport
costs for every unit purchased, i.e., transport costs increase linearly in the
quantity purchased. Onemay interpret τ as the cost a customer incurswhen
shipping one unit of the product to his location. Alternatively, it may be
viewed as the disutility the customer suffers when he buys a product that
does not fully match his ideal product. Then, qτ |Li−x| represents the total
transport costs borne by a customer located at x when buying a product
located at Li.
As customers are assumed to be utility maximizers, the above utility spec-
ification implies that a customer who is located at x and buys from firm i
has the following local demand
max
q
U(x, pi)⇒ ∂U
∂q
= 1− q − pi − τ |Li − x| = 0
⇒ q(x, pi) = 1− pi − τ |Li − x|. (2)
Note that with a per-unit transport cost, individual demand decreases as
the difference between the customer’s location (preferences) and the actual
product location (characteristics) grows. In contrast, the quantity a cus-
tomer demandswhen transport costs are on a lump-sumbasis depends only
on the price.
We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. Transport costs are such that the market is covered, i.e., 0 <
6
τ ≤ 8/3 =: τ¯ .
The assumption that the market is covered means that in equilibrium for
any number of firms, all customers along the circle buy from one firm, i.e.,
not buying at all is not optimal. However, as can be seen from expression
(2), this is only true if transport costs are not too high.7
In what follows, we will analyze the following two-stage free-entry game.
In the first stage, firms decide whether to enter the market. In the second
stage, firms compete in prices.
3 Results
In this section, we first derive the findings from the free-entry game to com-
pare them to the first-best and the second-best outcomes.
Free entry
We start by analyzing customers’ purchasing decisions. As we are inter-
ested in a symmetric equilibrium, suppose that all firms but firm i located
at Li = 0 charge the same price p. Then, plugging the local demand speci-
fied in expression (2) into the utility expression (1) implies that the indiffer-
ent customer between firm i and its neighboring firm at 1/n is located at a
distance x˜:
U(x˜, pi) = U(x˜, p)⇔ xˆ = 1
2n
− pi − p
2τ
.
7Specifically,Assumption 1 ensures that, for any numbern ≥ 2 of firms, even the customer
with the largest travel distance to a firm will buy a non-negative amount at the equilibrium
price (3). Note that this assumption is more restrictive than necessary but we use it for
simplicity. As we will point out below (see the next footnote), the upper bound is increasing
in the number of firms n, i.e., τ ≤ 8/3 represents the lowest value. As the number of firms
is determined endogenously, the upper bound could be endogenized too.
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Total demand at firm i by customers from the left and the right in the second
stage is thus given by
Qi = 2
∫ x˜
0
(1− pi − τx)dx.
Firm i’s profits amount to pii = piQi. LetA :=
√
4n2 − 4nτ + 13τ2. Proceed-
ing in the standard way to derive the optimal symmetric equilibrium prices
(i.e., pi = p), we have the following price in the second stage of the game
8
p =
2n+ 3τ −A
4n
. (3)
It is useful to analyze the comparative statics properties of the equilibrium
price.
Observation 1. Define τˆ := 2(1 + 3
√
3)n/13 ≈ 0.95325n and nˆ := (3√3 −
1)τ/4 ≈ 1.04904τ .
(i) Comparative statics with respect to transport costs τ give
∂p
∂τ


> 0 if 0 < τ < τˆ
= 0 if τ = τˆ
< 0 if τˆ < τ ≤ τ¯ .
8Note that in the symmetric equilibrium with n firms, the indifferent customer located
at an equal distance of 1/2n to two neighboring firms demands a quantity of
q
(
1
2n
, p
)
= 1−
2n+ 5τ −A
4n
.
Solving q(1/2n, p) ≥ 0, which is required to ensure a covered market, for τ gives two solu-
tions: 0 and 4n/3. For 0 < τ ≤ 4n/3, it holds that q(1/2n, p) ≥ 0. Setting n = 2 yields the
upper bound given in Assumption 1.
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(ii) Comparative statics with respect to the number of firms n give
∂p
∂n


> 0 if 2 ≤ n < nˆ
= 0 if n = nˆ
< 0 if n > nˆ.
Proof: Ad (i): it holds that ∂p/∂τ = (2n − 13nτ + 3A)/4nA. Solving
∂p/∂τ = 0 for τ gives τˆ as the only solution that lies within the bounds
specified by Assumption 1. Furthermore, it holds that ∂p/∂τ → 1/n > 0 for
τ → 0 and ∂2p/∂τ2 = −√3/6n2 < 0 for τ = τˆ .
Ad (ii): it holds that ∂p/∂n = −(2n − 13τ + 3A)/4n2A. Solving ∂p/∂n =
0 for n gives nˆ as the only solution that satisfies the condition that n ≤
2. Moreover, for n → ∞, it is true that ∂p/∂n → 0. Also, it holds that
∂2p/∂n2 = −128√3/(3√3− 1)4τ2 < 0 for n = nˆ.
The properties of the equilibrium price differ from the standardmodel with
inelastic demand (see, e.g., Tirole, 1988) as well as from the setup where
elastic demand depends only on the price but not on transport costs (see,
e.g., Gu and Wenzel, 2009). Whereas in those cases, the price unambigu-
ously increases in the transport-cost parameter τ , here the price may in-
crease or decrease in τ . This is because transport costs have two effects. On
the one hand, larger values of τ relax competition leading firms to increase
prices. On the other hand, larger values of τ also reduce individual demand
which forces firms to reduce their prices. For low values of τ , the first effect
dominates whereas for high values of τ , the second effect dominates.9
Similarly, the effect of additional competitors on prices is ambiguous. As in
the standard model, more firms means tougher competition because firms
9See also Rothschild (1997) or Rasch and Herre (2013) for a related discussion.
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are located closer to each other. On the other hand, additional competitors
also allow firms to target only those customers with high local demand.
For markets with few firms, the second effect dominates. However, as more
firms enter the market, the first effect becomes stronger and this effect even-
tually dominates.
The fact that the equilibrium price can be increasing in the number of firms
is an unexpected result in circular models. When disutility frommismatch-
ing is independent of the quantity consumed as in Gu and Wenzel (2012),
the equilibrium price unequivocally decreases in the number of firms. The
reason for this new result is that, in previous models, individual demand
is independent of the distance traveled although they may be price depen-
dent. In contrast, in the current model, both per-unit transport cost and the
distance traveled have an impact on individual demand given by expres-
sion (2). As a consequence, the overall demand can be less elastic when
customers travel less as the number of firms increases.10
Firm profits in the second stage amount to
pi =
(2n+ 3τ −A) (2n− 4τ +A)
16n3
.
Observation 2. Define B :=
3
√
7552 + 273
√
993 and τˇ := (−257 + B2 +
4B)n/39B ≈ 0.49008n.
10We note that an increase in the number of firms can also lead to a higher equilibrium
price for a range of reservation prices in the spokesmodel (Chen and Riordan, 2007). In such
cases in the spokesmodel, as the number of firms becomes higher, themonopoly segment—
where demand is surprisingly more elastic—shrinks and the competitive segment expands
and as a result, the overall demand elasticity reduces. In contrast, in the current paper, as the
number of firms increases, marginal customers are located closer to the firms and demand
a higher quantity at any given price. Hence, individual demand becomes less elastic, in
particular, when there are just a few firms active in the market (n < nˆ).
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(i) Comparative statics with respect to transport costs τ give
∂pi
∂τ


> 0 if 0 < τ < τˇ
= 0 if τ = τˇ
< 0 if τˇ < τ ≤ τ¯ .
(ii) Comparative statics with respect to the number of firms n give
∂pi
∂n
< 0.
Proof: Ad (i): it holds that ∂pi/∂τ = (14n2+nA−21nτ−25τA+91τ2)/8n3A.
Solving ∂pi/∂τ = 0 for τ gives τˇ as the only solution that lies within the
bounds specified by Assumption 1. Next, it is true that ∂pi/∂τ → 1/n2 > 0
for τ → 0 and ∂2pi/∂τ2 ≈ −0.5641/n3 < 0 for τ = τˇ .
Ad (ii): it holds that ∂pi/∂n = τ(−56n2−4nA+70nτ+75τA−273τ2)/16n4A.
Solving ∂pi/∂n = 0 for n gives two (real) solutions: τ/4 and 3τ/4. Note that
not even the greater of the two solutions satisfies the condition that n ≥ 2
as 3τ/4 ≥ 2 ⇔ τ ≥ 8/3 which contradicts Assumption 1. Note last that for
n = 2 and τ = 1, ∂pi/∂n = (67− 17√21)/256 ≈ −0.0426.
The parameter τ also has an ambiguous impact on firm profits. Note that
profits are particularly low when τ is relatively large. This observation will
later be helpful to explain why entry may be insufficient. Interestingly, an
increase in the number of competitors may lead to higher prices for cus-
tomers but firms’ profits do not increase at the same time. This means that
the negative effect on profits from a lower market share outweighs the pos-
itive price effect.
Turning to the firms’ entry decision in the first stage, assume that market
11
entry comes at a fixed cost f (with f > 0). We focus on those cases where
at least two firms enter which can be guaranteed by assuming sufficiently
low values of the entry cost f . As firm profits are strictly decreasing in
the number of firms, the maximum relevant entry cost is given for n = 2.
Denote this cost by f¯ . Hence, at least two firms enter the market as long as
f ≤
τ
(
4− 25τ + 7√16− 8τ + 13τ2
)
128
=: f¯ .
Since profits are strictly decreasing in the number of firms, the unique equi-
librium number of firms n∗ is implicitly characterized as the solution to11
pi(n∗)− f = 0.
First-best entry
We define social welfare as the sum of customer surplus and firm profits.
Unlike models with inelastic demand, prices matter due to their impact on
the quantities purchased. In the first-best welfare benchmark, social welfare
consists of total entry costs and customer welfare where the product price is
set equal to the marginal cost of production, i.e., pF = 0 (where superscript
F stands for first-best). Social welfare can then be expressed as
WF = 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
(1− τx)2
2
dx− nf = 12n
2 − 6nτ + τ2
24n2
− nf. (4)
Maximizing expression (4) with respect to the number of firms and defin-
ing C := 3
√
τf(−3τf +√−3τf(1− 3τf)), the first-best level of entry nF is
11Note that we have shown in Observation 2 that ∂pi(n, τ, f)/∂n < 0. Hence, the implicit
function theorem guarantees the existence of a unique n∗(τ, f) such that pi(n∗(τ, f), τ, f)−
f = 0.
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given by
nF =
3
√
3
(
3
√
3τf + C2
)
6fC
. (5)
As the free-entry level is only given implicitly, we cannot directly compare
the entry decision in the free-entry equilibrium and in the first-best sce-
nario. Instead, we consider pi(nF )−f . As firmprofits strictly decrease in the
number of firms, it holds that whenever pi(nF )− f < 0, there is insufficient
entry in the free-entry equilibrium and vice versa. Since the analytical ex-
pressions are cumbersome, we present the comparison graphically in Figure
1 below. Note that, in the figure, fF is defined as the fixed entry cost where
the scope of entry in the first best is equal to the free-entry equilibrium. For
any f < fF , there is excessive entry; for any fF < f ≤ f¯ , an insufficient
number of firms enter the market.
The figure shows that for relatively low levels of the fixed cost f , there is
always excessive entry. For higher levels of the fixed cost, whether entry
is excessive or insufficient depends on the transport costs. If the transport
costs are sufficiently large (small), we observe insufficient (excessive) entry.
The occurrence of insufficient entry can be explained by the observation that
firm profits are decreasing in the transport-cost parameter for high values
of τ (see Observation 2). With large values of τ customers would benefit to
a large extent from additional market entry but the incentives to enter are
low. As a consequence, the equilibrium level of entry falls short compared
to the optimal outcome.
We summarize this finding:
Result 1. Market entry is excessive compared to the first-best outcome for
low values of the entry cost f and/or low values of the transport costs τ .
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For high values of these parameters, market entry is insufficient.
Second-best entry
We now consider the optimal entry level under a second-best benchmark
where prices are set according to expression (3). Second-best social welfare
(superscript S) is given as
WS = 2n
∫ 1
2n
0
(1− p− τx)2
2
dx+ 2np
∫ 1
2n
0
(1− p− τx)dx− nf (6)
=
12n2 + 6nA− 24nτ + 9τA− 31τ2
48n2
− nf. (7)
Since we cannot derive an explicit expression for nS from the maximization
of expression (6), we instead consider ∂WS/∂n at n = nF to compare the
socially optimal scope of entry in the first-best and second-best regimes. It
holds that whenever ∂WS/∂n at n = nF is larger than zero, more entry is
desirable in the second best and vice versa.12
We state the following result:
Result 2. The second-best level of entry is higher than the first-best level.
[Place Figure 1 approximately here.]
It immediately follows that free entry can also be insufficient compared to
a second-best benchmark and that the parameter range where entry is in-
sufficient is larger than for the first-best comparison. Figure 1 provides a
12Analytical results are not obtainable, so we numerically verified that indeed ∂WS/∂n >
0 holds at n = nF for all permissible parameter values. The result is summarized in Figure
1. The figure shows that fS < fF and that, in particular, both lines do not intersect. This
implies that the second-best level of entry is higher than the first-best level.
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graphical illustration. In the figure, fS is defined as the fixed entry cost
where the level of entry in the second best is equal to the free-entry equilib-
rium. For any f < fS , toomany firms enter themarket from a social-welfare
perspective; for any fS < f ≤ f¯ , there is insufficient entry. From the figure
we can thus summarize:
Result 3. Market entry is excessive for low values of the entry cost f and/or
low values of the transport costs τ and insufficient for high values of these
parameters compared to the second-best outcome.
[Place Figure 2 approximately here.]
Note that this result extends previous findings. In settings with fixed trans-
port costs, entry levels can also be insufficient if the entry cost or trans-
port costs are high (Gu and Wenzel, 2012).13 Thus, a more general picture
emerges inmodels with price-sensitive demand. Independent of who bears
the transport costs and independent of whether the transport costs are on
a fixed or a per-unit basis, insufficient entry may arise for high levels of
transport costs. The reason for insufficient entry differ, however, between
models with fixed transport costs and with per-unit transport costs. With
fixed transport costs, insufficient entry arises as with high transport costs,
prices are high and customer demand is low whereas firm profits are high.
Contrary to that, with per-unit transport costs, insufficient entry arises as
the incentives to enter the market (that is, firm profits) are very low with
high transport costs because of the resulting downward shift of the local
demand function (see Observation 2). Note, however, that in both types of
13With delivered-price competition, insufficient entry also arises if fixed costs are large
(Matsumura and Okamura, 2006a).
15
models, the samemainmessage (though for different reasons) emerges, i.e.,
insufficient entry arises under high transport costs.
Figure 2 provides an alternative illustration of the comparison of market vs.
optimal entry. For a given fixed cost of entry of f = 0.055, the left panel
shows equilibrium and second-best entry; the right panel plots the differ-
ence between these two entry levels. The figure shows that the degree of
insufficient entry can become quite large for high values of the transport
cost parameter τ .14
In the Appendix, we provide a short extension to themodel and show some
evidence that assuming a more general utility function does not result in
qualitatively different results.
4 Conclusion
This paper revisits market and optimal entry in a circular-city model where
customer demand is price-sensitive and also depends on the transport costs
(per unit) a customer incurs. The main finding is that entry is not always
excessive. So far, this has only been shown for the case where transport
costs are on a lump-sum basis independent of the quantity. The current
paper extends this result to the case where transport costs are incurred for
each unit. Given that circular models of product differentiation are widely
used, the results of this paper may be of practical use for researchers in the
fields of industrial organization, regional science, and transport economics.
14Again, we stress thatAssumption 1 is stronger than needed as even at the highest level of
transport costs, the marginal customer would demand a strictly positive quantity. Indeed,
we could extend the analysis to higher values of the transport costs without violating the
assumption of a covered market. This would enlarge the area with insufficient entry.
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Our model fits markets where the quantities demanded by individual cus-
tomers depend on a unit price as well as the degree of matching between
product characteristics and individual preferences (such as food anddrinks;
visits to restaurants, pubs, and cinemas; travel demands). Our analysis sug-
gests that the price in these markets is not necessarily monotonic in trans-
port costs or the number of firms. As a policy implication, our paper sug-
gests that entry in markets, where product differentiation is of high impor-
tance to consumers (high transport cost), may be insufficient, and subsidiz-
ing entry in such market may be welfare-enhancing.
Appendix
Extension: More general utility function
In this short extension, we provide some evidence that assuming a more
general utility function does not result in qualitatively different results. A
customerwho is located at x andwho buys fromfirm i at locationLi derives
the following utility
U(x, pi) =
αq
β
− q
2
2β
− q (pi + τ |Li − x|) ,
where α, β > 0.
Given that customers are utility maximizers, this customer has the follow-
ing local demand when buying from firm i
q(x, pi) = α− βpi − βτ |Li − x|.
Proceeding in the exact same way as in the previous part, we can compare
17
the scope of entry in the different scenarios.15 Figure 3 illustrates the scope
of entry in the private optimum and the second best for two concrete ex-
amples (α = 1, β = 0.5; α = 1.5, β = 1). In the figure, the upper bound
on the entry cost f¯ as well as the critical fS where the scope of entry is the
same under free entry and in the second-best benchmark are given for the
two cases. As can be seen from the figure, there is again insufficient market
entry whenever both entry and transport costs are not too low. Moreover,
the relative scope of insufficient entry remains the same in these two alter-
native scenarios.16 We thus conclude that introducing parameters α and β
to allow for a more general utility specification does not qualitatively affect
our results concerning insufficient entry.
[Place Figure 3 approximately here.]
15Note that themodified utility function requires a slightly adapted assumption regarding
the transport-cost parameter. It must hold that 0 < τ ≤ 8α/3β.
16Note that we have not found a meaningful parameter set where (qualitative) results
changed.
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Figure 1: Entry comparison in the three scenarios: entry is insufficient (ex-
cessive) compared to the first-best benchmark if fF < f ≤ f¯ (f < fF ) and
insufficient (excessive) compared to the second-best benchmark if fS < f ≤
f¯ (f < fS).
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Figure 2: Entry comparison under free entry and in the second-best scenario
for f = 0.055.
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Figure 3: Comparison of entry decisions in the free-entry equilibrium and
the second-best benchmark for two cases: (i) α = 1, β = 0.5 (solid curves);
(ii) α = 1.5, β = 1 (dashed curves).
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